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The most recent book written by Mark G. E. Kelly, Associate Professor at 
Western Sydney University in Australia, has already received two distinct 
reviews (see Choat, 2018; Vogelmann, 2018). To justify this new review, I would 
like to make as comprehensive vision of the book as possible by considering 
the points made in the previous reviews and enriching them with my comments 
where necessary. However, according to the rules of the genre, I am obliged 
to reiterate some elements and considerations that were already mentioned 
in these reviews. Thus, I will start with the book’s outline and its purpose, then 
I will move to the interpretation of the problem the author raises, his overall 
thesis and arguments defending his position. Further, I will explore the content 
of the book taking in consideration other reviewers’ comments. After that, I will 
summarize points of praise and critique, which Kelly’s book faced. Finally, I will 
give my own analysis and evaluation of the work.
In the very beginning, Kelly tells his readers that the book “is for and not 
about Foucault” and “against and not about normative political theory” (Kelly, 
2018, p. 1). It means that the author’s focus is neither Foucault’s thought itself 
(there are previous Kelly’s books primarily devoted to it), nor normative political 
theory, but a defence of the view interpreting Foucault as a non-normative 
thinker, which actually is the main purpose of the book. Thus, Kelly raises two 
questions: why it is necessary to oppose normativity and how it is possible. He 
gives three arguments to the first question (see Kelly, 2018, pp. 7–8). We need 
to oppose normativity because, first, it limits the field of influence to those who 
adhere to these norms. The second argument is that normativity has unintended 
consequences. Finally, normativity is inherently dangerous. To answer the 
second question and to prove his thesis, Kelly interprets selected authors 
through the lens of his approach. He tries to show that Foucault, even late, 
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was an anti-normative thinker, and that his critique is superior to other approaches 
opposing normativity. He rejects the wider notion of normativity claiming that it has 
nothing in particular to do with norms (which is arguable), and chooses the stricter 
definition used in ethics, that is “ought”.
Kelly interprets Foucault’s alternative to normative political theory as threefold, 
for normative, “political, and theoretic aspects are closely interconnected” (Kelly, 
2018, p. 11). First, it is anti-normative in the way that it does not have a normative 
ground in opposing and criticizing things. Second, it is a-theoretical because it 
eschews systematization and does not try to “produce a totalizing explanation of 
everything” (Kelly, 2018, p. 11). Third, it is non-political in the sense of “party politics” 
(Kelly, 2018, p. 11) or, in other words, not being a part of politics as such. Shortly, 
Foucault’s method is a critique aimed to undermine things through its analysis. 
The book comprises Introduction, where Kelly determines the purpose of his work 
and sets up the methodological and conceptual framework: seven chapters each 
devoted to a single thinker one way or another related to Foucault – these are Marx, 
Lenin, Althusser, Deleuze, Rorty, Honneth, and Geuss, – the last chapter dedicated 
to Foucault’s scholarship, and Conclusion. On the whole, the book is indeed 
“something of an anthology” (Kelly, 2018, p. 13), therefore, the order of reading the 
book can be arbitrary.
In the first chapter devoted to Marx, Kelly tries to show from Foucauldian 
perspective that Marx was almost anti-normative thinker and in some sense 
precursor to Foucault. He calls Marx a “pivotal figure” (Kelly, 2018, p. 17) in the 
history of political thought. Kelly criticizes attempts made in 1970–80s Anglophone 
philosophy to rehabilitate Marx as a normative political philosopher, for his attitude 
towards capitalism was rather an analysis of how it works as a system rather than a 
moral condemnation. He analyzes Marx’s method and his core concepts, such as 
alienation, exploitation, slavery, and theft to prove that they are purely descriptive 
rather than normative. However, the author holds that Marx failed to promote a non-
normative alternative because he puts forward a political theory of communism, 
which according to Kelly inevitably relies on normative premises and becomes 
political utopian. Moreover, although Marx reached antinormativity, he was held 
back by Hegelianism.
The second chapter is devoted to Lenin. Kelly holds that through the comparative 
analysis of Russian Revolution and Lenin’s work “State and Revolution” it becomes 
clear that Lenin failed to realize his theory in practice, that is, incorporate it in real 
politics, and thus had to substitute it. As the result, there was the time of terror and 
totalitarianism. As regards to Foucault, Kelly holds that although Lenin invoked to 
“smash politics, and dispense with morality” (Kelly, 2018, p. 58), he was committed to 
Marx’s philosophical ideals.
In chapter three, Kelly criticizes Althusser for being not close enough to 
Foucault’s position because of being detached by his commitments to Marxism 
and Leninism. Moreover, Althusser’s adherence to French Communist Party 
and state-oriented politics makes him politically engaged thinker. He also uses 
some kind of theoretical tools in his thought. In Kelly’s words, “Althusser commits 
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to a kind of normativity, which resides in his being theoretical and political” 
(Kelly, 2018, p. 72).
Chapter four is meant to show fundamental differences between Foucault’s 
and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophies: “The former aims to demolish existing strategies 
of power through critical analysis of their operation, whereas the latter aims to build 
up a new positive account of reality in order to free constrained creative forces” 
(Kelly, 2018, p. 76). For this, Kelly mostly deals with Deleuze’s work “Postscript 
on Control Societies”. He criticizes Deleuze for so-called “normative theoreticism” 
and his attempt to include Foucault’s approach in his thought. In other words, Kelly 
claims that Deleuze’s thought is incompatible with Foucault’s genuine critical 
analysis. As Kelly puts it, “Deleuze’s political philosophy is based in the assertion 
of a metaphysics, in which forces try to free themselves from evil reconfigurations 
of them” (Kelly, 2018, p. 91).
In the fifth chapter, Kelly criticizes the way Richard Rorty reads Foucault: 
although Rorty was sympathetic to him, he adhered to normativity by looking for 
a “realistic utopia” (Kelly, 2018, p. 101). Kelly claims that Foucault’s ideas rather 
challenge Rorty’s pragmatic liberalism than support it. The same thing happens with 
Rorty’s idea of ethnocentric relativism, which “elevates his normative preferences to 
the status of inarguable political truths” (Kelly, 2018, p. 107).
The sixth chapter is devoted to contemporary critical thinker Axel Honneth. 
Kelly holds that Honneth, as well as Rorty, fails to understand Foucault’s position 
properly. Kelly labels Honneth’s thought as normative critical theory, and states 
that Foucault is a challenge for him rather than support. However, the main point of 
criticism is that Honneth considers Foucault in line with Frankfurt School theorists, 
thus blurring the differences between the thinkers and failing to combine Foucault 
and Habermas in his work.
In chapter seven, Kelly deals with recent works of Raymond Geuss. He criticizes 
the movement of political realism Geuss belongs to for the view that it is necessary to 
produce values (political, not moral) and engage in public policy, although the author 
is sympathetic to the realist critique of the “ethic-first” approach. Kelly concludes 
that normativity, politics, and theory need to be stamped out on the basis of their 
failure to account for social complexity.
In his final chapter, Kelly directly aims to defend Foucault from normativity 
by referring to works of Paul Patton in several steps: he analyzes Patton’s original 
interpretation of Foucault as an anti-normative thinker. Then Kelly answers to the 
criticism holding that political thought is inevitably based on normative ground, 
which means that Foucault either incoherent or eventually normative. Then he 
examines Patton’s defence of Foucault against Charles Taylor’s criticism. Finally, 
Kelly criticizes Patton’s later work on Foucault, human rights and neoliberalism 
and his claim that late Foucault became a normative thinker claiming that referring 
to the problem of rights is merely “a call for rights only qua limitations on power” 
(Kelly, 2018, p. 156).
In conclusion, Kelly explains that he sees his work as an attempt of “catching 
up with Foucault” (Kelly, 2018, p. 169) because he is considered as the last thinker 
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of anti-normative thought. Kelly contends that even other French thinkers, such as 
Rancierre, Badiou and Balibar, were sub-Foucauldian because different kinds of 
commitments to normativity, politics, and/or theory can be found in their ideas. 
As for Badiou, Kelly argues about political character of his thought. Rancierre, 
in his turn, is the closest to Foucault’s position, as Kelly claims, however, his 
theoretization makes him in some sense normative thinker. And Balibar falls for 
politics more than other two in terms of attempts to “positively determine the goals 
of politics” (Kelly, 2018, p. 171). Kelly comes to conclusion that we need to admit 
the urgency of our “ability to think, act, and live differently” (Kelly, 2018, p. 172). 
Kelly admits that  we are probably “still caught in the old Enlightenment problematic” 
(Kelly, 2018, p. 172). As its outcome, Kelly shows Trump’s triumph as an example 
and normative political theory’s inability to resist it. For Kelly, this demonstrates 
that Foucault’s anti-normative critique is highly relevant also because today 
“action urgently needs a new strategic analysis of power relations to inform it” 
(Kelly, 2018, p. 173). 
To conclude, I would like to summarize both merits and shortcoming noted 
by other reviewers. Simon Choat acknowledges the book’s style that makes the 
argument clear and consistent, although it relates to the Continental tradition 
characterized by “the pretension and needless obscurity” (Choat, 2018, p. 1). 
However, he considers some of Kelly’s arguments against normative political 
theory unconvincing, and doubts on the demarcation line between theory and 
critique. He claims that “overzealous” (Choat, 2018, p. 4) defence and interpretation 
of Foucault’s approach as flawless weakens the book. Сhoat finishes his review 
with a statement, which is absolutely out of place, that it is not acceptable in 2018 
“to write eight chapters on political thinkers and to fail to include any women or non-
white thinkers” (Choat, 2018, p. 4). Moreover, almost nothing is mentioned about 
the book’s content. 
In his turn, Frieder Vogelmann assesses the book as threefold: (1) original for 
Kelly’s “overall thesis that political thinking should follow Foucault’s model of non-
normative critique” (Vogelmann, 2018); (2) provoking for combination of author’s 
thesis and criticism against both analytic and continental normative political 
thinking; and most importantly (3), infuriating for Kelly’s deliberate refutation for his 
far-reaching claims. Vogelmann is dissatisfied with insufficient outline of Foucault’s 
conceptual apparatus claiming that “it weakens the book’s persuasive power” 
(Vogelmann, 2018). He analyses each chapter in detail and also challenges Kelly’s 
approach and its three core elements: normativity, theory, and politics. However, 
Vogelmann does not give proper attention to the final chapter and conclusion, which 
I think are no less important parts of the book.
Throughout the book’s outline and other reviewers’ assessment, it has become 
clear that it is not perfect and has some shortcomings. Nevertheless, it does not belittle 
the book’s importance. I would recommend this book to those, first, who are interested 
in Foucault’s scholarship, particularly in his political thought. Second, this book can 
be useful for scholars concerned with normative political theory and its alternatives, 
for the view of continental tradition presented here challenges the analytic paradigm 
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dominating within the field. Finally, this book might be useful  for scholars who are 
interested at least in one of the thinkers presented in chapters, for it can give a great 
opportunity to look at them from the other side.
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